The notion of smooth entropy allows a unifying, generalized formulation of privacy amplication and entropy smoothing. Smooth entropy is a measure for the number of almost uniform random bits that can be extracted from a random source by probabilistic algorithms. It is known that the R enyi entropy of order at least 2 of a random variable is a lower bound for its smooth entropy. On the other hand, an assumption about Shannon entropy (which is R enyi entropy of order 1) is too weak to guarantee any non-trivial amount of smooth entropy. In this work we close the gap between R enyi entropy of order 1 and 2. In particular, we show that R enyi entropy of order for any 1 < < 2 is a lower bound for smooth entropy, up to a small parameter depending on , the alphabet size and the failure probability. The results have applications in cryptography for unconditionally secure protocols such as quantum key agreement, key agreement from correlated information, oblivious transfer, and bit commitment.
Introduction
Entropy smoothing is the process of converting an arbitrary random source into a source with smaller alphabet and almost uniform distribution. Smooth entropy is an information measure that has been proposed recently 7] to quantify the number of almost uniform bits that can be extracted by a probabilistic algorithm from any member of a set of random variables. It uni es previous work on privacy ampli cation in cryptography and on entropy smoothing in theoretical computer science and enables a systematic investigation of entropy smoothing and its e ciency.
The main question of entropy smoothing is: Given an arbitrary random source, how many uniformly random bits can be extracted? The formalization of smooth entropy allows for an arbitrarily small deviation of the output bits from perfectly uniform random bits that may include a small correlation with the random bits used for smoothing. The inclusion of randomized extraction functions is the main di erence between entropy smoothing and \pure" random number generation in information theory 19] , where no additional random sources are available. However, entropy smoothing does not consider the auxiliary random bits as a resource, unlike extractors used in theoretical computer science 17] .
In cryptography, entropy smoothing is known as privacy ampli cation. Introduced in 1985 3, 4] and later generalized 2], it has become a key component of unconditionally secure cryptographic protocols with such various purposes as key agreement from correlated Supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, grant no. 20-42105.94. information 16] , key agreement over quantum channels 1, 5] , oblivious transfer 6], and bit commitment 10].
Privacy ampli cation, for short, is a process that allows two parties to distill a secret key from common information about which an adversary has partial knowledge. The two parties do not know anything about the adversary's knowledge except that it satis es a general bound. By using a publicly chosen compression function, they are nevertheless able to extract a short key from their common information such that the total knowledge of the adversary about the key is arbitrarily small.
Apart from the applications in cryptography, entropy smoothing is also at the core of many constructions in complexity theory. Examples are pseudorandom generation 11, 14] , derandomization of algorithms 15], hardness results in computational learning theory 13], and computing with degenerate, weak random sources 20]. A survey of these applications is given by Nisan 17] .
Bennett et al. 4 , 2] and Impagliazzo et al. 12] independently analyzed entropy smoothing by universal hash functions 8] and showed that the length of the almost uniform output depends on the R enyi entropy of order 2 of the input. Privacy ampli cation can therefore be applied if the two parties assume a lower bound on the R enyi entropy of order 2 of the adversary's knowledge about their information. By the properties of R enyi entropy, it is straightforward to extend this result to R enyi entropy of any order > 2.
On the other hand, it is known that a lower bound in terms of R enyi entropy of order 1 (which is equivalent to entropy in the sense of Shannon) is not su cient to extract a non-trivial amount of uniform bits 2].
In this work, we close this gap and prove a lower bound on smooth entropy in terms of R enyi entropy of order for any between 1 and 2. Our result shows that the number of almost uniform bits that can be extracted with high probability from a random variable is given by its R enyi entropy order , for any > 1, up to a correcting term depending on , the alphabet size and the failure probability. The correcting term becomes dominating for ! 1.
In a second part, we show that tighter lower bounds for smooth entropy can be obtained if one makes additional assumptions about the distribution. In particular, we show how an assumption about the so-called pro le of the random variable leads to a lower bound on its smooth entropy that can be much tighter than the one given by R enyi entropy.
The results can be applied immediately to any of the above-mentioned scenarios using entropy smoothing and, in particular, to all applications of privacy ampli cation in cryptography. Our analysis shows that entropy smoothing by universal hashing is, in general, much more e cient than what was guaranteed by previous results using R enyi entropy of order 2. This has important consequences for the e ciency of these protocols.
The paper is organized as follows. Entropy and R enyi entropy are introduced in Section 2 and a review of smooth entropy is provided in Section 3. Our results are based on the spoiling knowledge proof technique, which is introduced in Section 4. The main result is proved in Section 5, and Section 6 contains the derivation of the tighter bound in terms of the pro le.
Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with the notion of entropy and the basic concepts of information theory 9]. We repeat some fundamental de nitions in this section and introduce the notation. All logarithms in this paper are to the base 2. The cardinality of a set S is denoted by jSj.
A random variable X induces a probability distribution P X over an alphabet X. Random variables are denoted by capital letters. If not stated otherwise, the alphabet of a random variable is denoted by the corresponding script letter. Families of random variables are denoted by X.
The expected value of a real-valued random variable X is denoted by E X]. The k-th moment inequality for any real-valued random variable X, any integer k > 0, and t 2 R + is
Another useful bound for any real-valued random variable X, any t 2 R + , and any r 2 R is 14]
The (Shannon) entropy of a random variable X with probability distribution P X and alphabet X is de ned as H(X) = ? X x2X P X (x) log P X (x):
The The relative entropy or discrimination between two probability distributions P X and P Y with the same alphabet X is de ned as (using 0 log 0 q = 0 and p log p 0 = 1)
The R enyi entropy of order of a random variable X with alphabet X is H (X) = 1 1 ? log X x2X P X (x) for 0 and 6 = 1 18] . Because the limiting case of R enyi entropy for ! 1 is Shannon entropy, we can extend the de nition to H 1 (X) = H(X). In the other limiting case ! 1, we obtain the min-entropy, de ned as H 1 (X) = ? log max x2X P X (x):
For a xed random variable X, R enyi entropy is a continuous positive decreasing function of . For 0 < < ,
with equality if and only if X is uniformly distributed over some subset of X. In particular, log jXj H (X) 0 for 0 and H(X) H (X) for > 1.
3 Review of Smooth Entropy and Privacy Ampli cation Smooth entropy 7] is an abstraction and a generalized formulation of privacy ampli cation 2] and entropy smoothing 12, 14] . As an information measure, smooth entropy is de ned operationally with respect to an application scenario (similar to channel capacity 9]). Its value cannot be computed immediately for a given probability distribution. This contrasts with other entropy measures such as Shannon or R enyi entropy that are de ned formally in terms of a probability distribution.
Consider a random variable X. We want to apply a smoothing function f : X ! Y to X such that Y = f(X) is uniformly distributed over its range Y. The size of the largest Y such that Y is still su ciently uniform is a measure for the amount of smooth entropy inherent in X, relative to the allowed deviation from perfect uniformity. To quantify this deviation we use a nonuniformity measure M that associates with every random variable X a positive number M(X) that is 0 if and only if P X is the uniform distribution P U over X. Examples for M are relative entropy D(P X kP U ) = log jXj ? H(X) or L 1 distance kP X ? P U k 1 = P x2X jP X (x) ? 1 jXj j.
The smoothing algorithm should be able to produce outputs that achieve some desired uniformity. More uniform outputs can usually be obtained by reducing the output size. We introduce the parameter s to control the trade-o between the uniformity of the output and the amount of entropy lost in the smoothing process.
Probabilistic smoothing functions are formalized by extending the input of f with an additional random variable T that models the random choices of f. However, T must be independent of X and its value must be known to ensure that no randomness from T is inserted into Y . The size of T is explicitly ignored.
It can be tolerated that the uniformity bound for an extraction process fails if an error event E occurs. E should have small probability, denoted by , and may depend on X. The uniformity is calculated only in the case that the complementary event E occurs.
In many applications it is only known that the random variable X has some property that is shared by many others. Therefore, smooth entropy is de ned for a family of random variables X with the same alphabet. The same smoothing algorithm is required to work for all probability distributions in the family.
De nition 1 ( 7] ). Let M be a nonuniformity measure and let : R ! R be a decreasing non-negative function. A family X of random variables with alphabet X has smooth entropy (X) within (s) in terms of M] with probability 1 ? if (X) is the maximum of all such that for any security parameter s 0, a random variable T and a function f : X T ! Y exist with jYj = b2 ?s c such that for all X 2 X there is a failure event E that has probability at most , and the expected value over T of the nonuniformity M of Y = f(X; T), given T and E, is at most (s). Formally, (X) = max n 8s 0 : 9T; f : X T ! Y; jYj = b2 ?s c :
For singleton sets fXg, we also use (X) instead of (fXg). The failure probability can be integrated into the uniformity parameter (s) for certain nonuniformity measures such as L 1 distance.
The principal method for extracting smooth entropy is based on universal hashing. A universal hash function 8] is a set G of functions X ! Y such that for all distinct x 1 ; x 2 2 X, there are at most jGj=jYj functions g in G such that g(x 1 ) = g(x 2 ). Privacy ampli cation is fundamental for many unconditionally secure cryptographic protocols 2]. Assume Alice and Bob share a random variable W, while an eavesdropper Eve knows a correlated random variable V that summarizes her knowledge about W. The details of the distribution P WV , and thus of Eve's information V about W, are unknown to Alice and Bob, except that they assume a lower bound on the R enyi entropy of order 2 of P WjV =v for the particular value v that Eve observes.
Using an authentic public channel, which is susceptible to eavesdropping but immune to tampering, Alice and Bob wish to agree on a function g such that Eve knows nearly nothing about g(W). The The theorem can be applied in the described scenario by replacing P X with the conditional probability distribution P WjV =v . The Privacy Ampli cation Theorem implies that H 2 (X) is a lower bound for smooth entropy. It is crucial that the same smoothing algorithm can be applied to any X from a family X of random variables and produce an output of the desired size and uniformity.
Corollary 2 ( 7] ). The smooth entropy of a family X of random variables within 2 ?s = ln 2 in terms of relative entropy with probability 1 is at least the minimum R enyi entropy of order 2 of any X 2 X.
Note that Shannon entropy cannot be used as a lower bound for smooth entropy. This was observed by Bennett et al. 2] and is illustrated in the following example. Example 1. Suppose that everything we know about a random variable X is H(X) t. Then P X could be such that P X (x 0 ) = p for some x 0 2 X with p = 1 ? t=log(jXj ? 1) and P X (x) = (1 ? p)=(jXj ? 1) for all x 6 = x 0 . X satis es H(X) = h(p) + (1 ? p) log(jX j ? 1) t. But X = x 0 occurs with probability p, and no matter how small a Y is extracted from X, its value can be predicted with probability p. Thus, with knowledge of a lower bound on H(X) alone, the probability that X is guessed correctly cannot be reduced and only a small part of the randomness in X can be converted to uniform bits. Therefore, the entropy of a random variable is not an adequate measure of its smooth entropy. In other words, there are random variables with arbitrarily large entropy and almost no smooth entropy. g
Spoiling Knowledge Proofs
As noted above, R enyi entropy of order 2 is a lower bound for smooth entropy. A counterintuitive property of conditional R enyi entropy of order > 1 is that it can increase even on the average when conditioned on a random variable that provides side information. Suppose side information that increases the R enyi entropy is made available by an imaginary oracle. This increase can be exploited to prove lower bounds on smooth entropy that are much tighter than R enyi entropy of order 2. Side information of this kind was introduced by Bennett et al. 2] and is called spoiling knowledge because it leads to less information about the output of the smoothing process.
We (X) max
Note that the oracle knows the particular distribution of the random variable that is to be smoothed (e.g. the adversary's knowledge in privacy ampli cation) and can prepare the side information depending on that distribution.
For the construction of the lower bounds, we introduce special side information U with alphabet f0; : : : ; mg. Let U = f(X) be the deterministic function of X given by f(x) = ( m if P X (x) 2 ?m b? log P X (x)c otherwise.
We call side information U of this type log-partition spoiling knowledge because U partitions the values of X into sets of approximately equal probability and because it is most useful with m log jXj. For such m, the values of the probability distributions P XjU=u di er at most by a factor of two for all u except for u = m.
In the following, let p min = min x2X P X (x) and p max = max x2X P X (x):
The following two lemmas show that R enyi entropy of order 2 and Shannon entropy cannot di er arbitrarily for probability distributions where p min and p max are a constant factor apart. It is easy to see that maximum of p max ? p min is reached when P X (x) = p min for all x except for the one that has maximal probability p max = c p min . The lemma follows directly.
If the minimum and maximum probability in a distribution P X do not di er by more than a constant factor, then the R enyi entropy of order 2 of X is at most a constant below the Shannon entropy.
Lemma 5. Let X be a random variable with alphabet X such that p max c p min for some c > 1. Then H 2 (X) > H(X) ? 2 log c:
Proof. Lemma 4 is used in the second inequality of the following derivation: H(X) ? H 2 (X) = H(X) + log X by assuming only a lower bound t on H 2 (X), approximately t almost uniform random bits can be extracted from X and the deviation from a uniform distribution decreases exponentially when fewer bits are extracted.
In some applications, only the stronger bound H 1 (X) t in terms of min-entropy is assumed, equivalent to bounding the maximum probability of any value of X. Indeed, Theorem 1 holds if an assumption about H (X) for any 2 is made because H 2 (X) H (X) for 2 by (4).
On the other hand, it is known from Example 1 that a lower bound on H 1 (X) = H(X) is not su cient to guarantee a non-trivial amount of smooth entropy. Rather, the smooth entropy could be arbitrarily small if no further assumptions are made. In this section we examine the remaining range for 1 < < 2. We show that, with high probability, the smooth entropy of X is lower bounded by H (X), up to the logarithm of the alphabet size and some security parameters depending on and on the error probability.
Our approach uses a spoiling knowledge argument. We will use side information U such that for any distribution of X, with high probability, U takes on a value u for which H 2 (XjU = u) is not far below H (X). A simple and very weak bound that always holds follows from the next lemma.
Lemma 6. For any random variable X and for any > 1,
Proof. Because > 1,
The lower bound follows from (4). We conclude that H 2 (X) H 1 (X)
? 1 H (X) for any > 1. However, this bound is multiplicative in ? 1 which limits its usefulness for ! 1. The tighter bound derived below is only additive in ( ? 1) ?1 . It is based on the following theorem that provides the connection between the R enyi entropy of order > 1 conditioned on side information and the R enyi entropy of the joint distribution. 
The only thing missing is a bound for the term log P Y (y). However, large values of jlog P Y (Y )j occur only with small probability. For any t > 0, P P Y (Y ) < 2 ?t =jYj = X y : P Y (y) < 2 ?t =jYj P Y (y) < 2 ?t because there are only jYj terms in the summation. Therefore, with probability at least 1?2 ?t , Y takes on a value y for which log P Y (y) ?t ? log jYj (8) and the theorem follows from (7) and (8) by the union bound.
Applying this bound for log-partition side information gives the main result of this paper and shows how smooth entropy is lower bounded by R enyi entropy of order for any > 1.
Theorem 8. Fix r; t > 0, let m be an integer such that m ? log(m + 1) > log jXj + t, and let s be the security parameter for smooth entropy. We again use log-partition spoiling-knowledge U = f(X) with alphabet f0; : : : ; mg as de ned above. Because f is a deterministic function of X, we have H (XU) = H (X) and Theorem 7 shows that U takes on a value u for which H (XjU = u) H (X) ? log jUj ? r ? 1 ? t with probability at least 1 ? 2 ?r ? 2 ?t . Because m > log jXj, Lemma 5 can be applied with c 2 and by (4) it follows for all u 6 = m that H 2 (XjU = u) > H(XjU = u) ? 2 H (XjU = u) ? 2: Combining these results shows that the probability that U takes on a value u 6 = m for which H 2 (XjU = u) H (X) ? log(m + 1) ? r ? 1 ? t ? 2 (9) is at least 1 ? 2 ?r ? 2 ?t .
Remember that in (8) in the proof of Theorem 7, values of U with probability less than 2 ?t?log jUj have been excluded. Therefore, if m is chosen such that P U = m] = X x : P X (x) < 2 ?m P X (x) jXj 2 ?m < 2 ?t?log jUj then U = m does not occur in (9) . Choosing m such that m ? log(m + 1) > log jXj + t achieves this and applying Theorem 3 completes the proof. Corollary 9. Let X be a family of random variables and let r; t; m, and s be de ned as in the theorem above. The corollary follows from the fact that the oracle knows the distribution of the random variable X 2 X to be smoothed and can prepare the side information accordingly. Especially for large alphabets, these results can yield much better bounds on smooth entropy than R enyi entropy of order 2. The logarithmic term vanishes asymptotically with the alphabet size:
For any > 1, the ratio between smooth entropy and the logarithm of the alphabet size is asymptotically lower bounded by the ratio between R enyi entropy of order and the logarithm of the alphabet size. .) The lower bound on (X) by R enyi entropy of order 2 is weak because H 2 (X) < n= . However, H(X ) is very close to n bits. The last section shows how smooth entropy can be lower bounded by R enyi entropy of order for any > 1. This bound, however, is not tight for small alphabet sizes. We derive a tighter bound in this section that depends on an assumption about the pro le of the probability distribution (de ned below). The bound is tighter than the one of Theorem 8, especially for smaller alphabets. We use again log-partition spoiling knowledge U 2 U = f0; : : : ; mg as de ned above. For a xed value m, de ne the pro le X of the random variable X as the function X : U ! N such that for u < m X (u) = x 2 X j 2 ?u?1 < P X (x) 2 ?u and X (m) = x 2 X j P X (x) 2 ?m :
The expected di erence (over U) between the logarithm of the pro le X (u) and the conditional entropy of X given U, H(XjU = u), can be used to obtain a lower bound on smooth entropy. Examining the structure of the probability distributions P XjU=u for all u such that X (u) 2, we see that the logarithm of the pro le, X (u), is close to the conditional entropy, H(XjU = u), in the sense that log X (u) H(XjU = u) h 2 X (u) + 1 + log ? X (u) ? 1 : (10) (h denotes the binary entropy function.) Note that H(XjU = u) = 0 for the remaining u with X (u) < 2. Therefore,
X (U) ? 1 i : (11) We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 10. Let X be a random variable, let > 0, let m be an integer such that m log jXj + log 1 , let t > 0, and let k be a positive integer. Let U be the log-partition side information for X introduced above and let (u) = max log X (u) ? E U for all u such that X (u) 2 and (u) = E U log X (U)] for u such that X (u) < 2. If E U (U) k t k ; the following lower bound on the smooth entropy of X within 2 ?s = ln 2 in terms of relative entropy holds with probability at least 1 ? 2 : (X) H(XjU) ? t ? 2 H(X) ? log(m + 1) ? t ? 2: Proof. Let (u) = H(XjU = u) be a function of u 2 U that denotes the entropy of X given U = u and consider the random variable C = (U). The expectation E C] is equal to H(XjU) H(X) ? log(m + 1). Applying the k-th moment inequality (1), we see that P jC ? E C]j t E jC ? E C]j k t k : (12) If this probability is small, then H(XjU = u) H(XjU) ? t with high probability. Using (10) and (11), we can bound the probability in (12): where the last step follows form the de nition of (u). We conclude from (12) and from the assumption of the theorem that H(XjU = u) H(XjU) ? t occurs with probability at least 1 ? . It follows from Lemma 5 that for u 6 = m H 2 (XjU = u) H(XjU) ? t ? 2:
But the event U = m has small probability because the choice of m guarantees that P U = m] = X x : P X (x)<2 ?m P X (x) jXj 2 ?m :
By the union bound, the total probability that (13) fails is 2 and the proof is completed by applying Theorem 3.
Example 4. Consider again the random variable X 8 from Example 2. For n = 100 and desired total failure probability 2 ?19 , the bound of Theorem 8 cannot be applied and we have to resort to R enyi entropy of order 2 that shows (X 8 ) 12:5 (within 2 ?s = ln 2 in terms of relative entropy).
Applying Theorem 10 with = 2 ?20 , t = 12, and k = 6, however, shows that (X 8 ) 84:6. Therefore, a 60-bit string Y can be extracted from X 8 by a randomly chosen universal hash function such that H(Y jT) 60 ? 2 ?24 = ln 2. g As the example shows, the bound on smooth entropy by Theorem 10 can be much tighter than R enyi entropy of order 2 and also tighter than the bound of Theorem 8. However, this comes at the cost of the stronger assumption that must be made in terms of the pro le of the distribution to be smoothed.
